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DISTANT NEIGHBOURS ? : 
JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS REVISITED* 
 
Brian Bridges 
Lingnan University 
 
Abstract 
 
Japan’s relations with the two Koreas have remained complicated 
and controversial, as recent anti-Japanese protests in South Korea 
demonstrate. This paper discusses the progress in bringing 
reconciliation between Japan and South Korea through an 
examination of four elements in the bilateral relationship: the 
historical legacies, the economic competition, the security 
imperatives (including the relationship with North Korea), and the 
flows of popular culture and people. It argues that the slowly 
improving bilateral Japan-South Korea relationship, to which 
growing economic interdependence, heightened interest in popular 
culture, and shared beliefs in peace and stability in North-east Asia 
all contribute, is nonetheless still subject to strong emotional surges 
and responses to perceived slights on both sides. The recent upsurge 
in tension, primarily over how Japan views its past, suggests that 
reconciliation will continue to be a slow and even contradictory 
process. 
 
 
Twelve years ago I published a book on Japan’s relations with the 
two Koreas in which I took as a sub-title ‘From Antagonism to 
Adjustment’. One of the justifications for that sub-title was my belief 
that at the time - just after the end of the Cold War - the changes and 
uncertainties in the international order were mirrored by transitional 
but nonetheless beneficial processes in the triangular relations 
between North and South Korea and between those two countries 
                                                           
* This is a revised version of a paper entitled ‘Not So Distant Neighbours?: 
Korea-Japan Relations Revisited’, presented at the Workshop on Korea Today: Media 
and Modernity, hosted by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, 8 
April 2005. This Workshop received sponsorship from the Korea Foundation. I am 
grateful for the comments by participants at the Workshop on the earlier version of 
this paper. 
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and Japan. While I was broadly optimistic about the processes of 
reconciliation apparent at the time in all three relationships around 
the triangle, I did add the caveat that ‘emotional legacies, ideological 
remnants, economic competition, and differing national security 
perspectives’ would continue to influence the complex 
inter-relationships (Bridges 1993: 173).  
 
This year, 2005, is a particularly appropriate year to review the state 
of Korea-Japan relations. This June sees the fortieth anniversary of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and South 
Korea through the Basic Treaty and the event is being celebrated by 
a large number of events in both countries as well as by exchanges 
of visits by senior politicians (and, just possibly, by the Japanese 
Crown Prince and Princess going to South Korea). However, this 
year also sees in August the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War (the end of the Japanese occupation of Korea) 
and in November the hundredth anniversary of the Japan-Korea 
treaty which paved the way for that colonial occupation.  
 
In this particular paper, I wish to focus primarily on the Japan-South 
Korea relationship, although clearly that cannot be considered in 
isolation from the two countries’ relations with North Korea. I will 
examine the state of relations under four broad headings: historical 
legacies, economic power, security imperatives, and what might 
loosely and rather flippantly be described as ‘people power’ and then 
discuss how these underlying elements and more recent 
developments contribute to or hinder the process of reconciliation 
between Koreans and Japanese. 
 
Legacies of history 
 
For both the Japanese and the Koreans, whether living in the North 
or the South, the past has a strong influence on how the present is 
perceived. Memories of the harsh Japanese colonial period act as an 
emotional backdrop to Japan’s involvement in contemporary Korean 
affairs. It took twenty years after the end of the Second World War 
for Japan to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea and it 
has still not recognised the North. The relevance of history to 
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today’s relationships continues to be evident, as shown most recently 
in the popular and governmental reactions in South Korea to 
Japanese actions over the outstanding territorial issue and Japanese 
history textbooks.  
 
Historical consciousness in the two countries involves ‘emotions and 
perceptions and images in the whole population of Japan and South 
Korea, which may not necessarily be correct’, but are nonetheless 
widely felt (Ducke 2002, p. 31).  On the South Korean side, the 
negative images of Japan are strongly based on and, arguably, help 
to contribute to the construction of Korean self-identity through the 
opposition to and contrast with Japan. On the Japanese side, a 
lingering superiority complex intermingles with, at least until the 
past decade or so, a degree of indifference about the neighbouring 
Koreans (one survey in the early 1990s showed that 20% of Japanese 
did not even realise that Korea had been a Japanese colony (Ducke 
2002, p. 41)).  
 
Three issues seem to have become a measure of the pervasiveness of 
historical legacies in this bilateral relationship: apologies, territorial 
disputes and compensation.  According to Lily Feldman, ‘apology 
for historical wrongs….is a prerequisite for fundamental departure’ 
(Feldman 1999, p. 335); Suzanne Choi and Roman David in their 
analysis of forgiveness and apology also note a tendency across 
much of the literature to reach a similar conclusion (Choi and David 
2004). Certainly, Koreans have long argued for proper apologies 
from the Japanese side - and the German example is often cited 
favourably by comparison - while the Japanese tend to feel that these 
criticisms are unjustified and even counter-productive. Nonetheless, 
the Japanese government has been more willing since the early 
1990s to issue apologetic statements (see the verbal comments by 
prime ministers Hosokawa Morihiro and Murayama Tomiichi during 
1993-95 and, most importantly, the written apology by Obuchi 
Keizo in 1998). These conciliatory gestures have not prevented 
certain Japanese right-wing politicians, including sometimes those in 
cabinet positions, from making occasional so-called ‘reckless 
remarks’ about the colonial period. However, at least the Japanese 
government has reacted more sensitively to these episodes by 
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apologising and sacking offending ministers (Ducke 2002, pp. 
35-38). Nonetheless, linked to this apology issue is also South 
Korean disquiet over current prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s 
repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine (and his refusal to discontinue 
them) and periodic revisions to Japanese history textbooks, of which 
the most recent occurred in the spring of 2005 (on the background to 
the history textbooks disputes with Korea see Lee 1985: pp. 
141-164).  
 
South Korea and Japan have a long-standing territorial dispute over 
two tiny rock islands known as Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in 
Japanese. Both sides parade various historical and legal justifications 
for their respective claims, the South Koreans maintain a maritime 
guard unit there, and rather ritualistically the Japanese make annual 
diplomatic protests and the South Korean side responds in kind. 
While it is a long-simmering dispute, over the past five decades it 
has tended to become prominent only when tension has entered the 
relationship for some other reason (Bridges 1993, pp. 65-66). 
Therefore, it is unusual that this year it seems that it is the raising of 
the Japanese profile over this claim, primarily through the nearby 
Japanese prefecture of Shimane’s designation of a ‘Takeshima Day’, 
which is helping to bring some tension back into the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
More consistently contentious in recent years, however, has been the 
issue of compensation for the victims of Japanese wartime policies, 
in particular the so-called ‘comfort women’. The 1965 Basic Treaty 
saw South Korea giving up all compensation claims in return for 
Japanese economic assistance, but the ‘comfort women’, whose 
plight only began to be publicly acknowledged by Japanese veterans 
and surviving women in the late 1980s, were not specifically 
covered. The Japanese government, no doubt wary of setting 
precedents, has refused to accept governmental responsibility but has 
instead made some movement forward by encouraging Japanese 
companies to set up an ‘Asian Women Fund’ to disburse some 
financial compensation. Efforts by former ‘comfort women’ to use 
the courts to gain compensation have been comparatively 
unsuccessful, the most recent court case finally failing in November 
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2004 after a 13-year legal process (Ducke 2002, pp. 56-67; Lewis 
2002, pp. 1261-28). Yet, in December 2004, when for the first time a 
Japanese cabinet official met former ‘comfort women’, an apology 
was specifically made. However, in contrast to past Korean 
governments’ low-key approach to all aspects of the compensation 
issue, in March this year South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun 
resurrected the compensation issue, arguing that: ‘We need to bring 
to light the historical truth, apologise and reflect, pay compensation 
should there be things that need to be compensated, and reconcile’ 
(Chosun Ilbo, English internet edition, 1 March 2005). Unification 
Minister Chung Dong-yong then followed up by specifically calling 
on Japan to compensate those victims not covered by the 1965 treaty 
(Korea Times, 17 March 2005).  
  
How far do these historical issues interact with the broader 
relationship? Two recent periods can be considered important. The 
first relates to 1998, the first year of the Kim Dae-jung 
administration. Leaders of countries, especially when visiting other 
countries, are often tempted to indulge in the rhetoric of proclaiming 
a ‘new era’ in relations. This kind of rhetoric has been seen in the 
case of Korea-Japan relations too - and not infrequently the 
follow-up has been less than substantial - yet, officials and 
academics that I interviewed in both Seoul and Tokyo last autumn 
did comment on the significance of the attitude and policies of Kim 
Dae-jung. Kim altered the dynamics of the Japan-South Korea 
relationship in two important ways, one relating to the historical past 
and the other to the relationship with North Korea (which will be 
dealt with separately later on).  
 
Kim did try hard to translate some of the oft-repeated rhetoric of 
improving the bilateral relationship into reality. By progressively 
lifting the bans on many items of Japanese popular culture and also 
on certain Japanese manufactured goods, as well as by using the 
opportunity of his visit to Japan in October 1998 to show a 
willingness to put aside the habit of continually referring to the 
legacies of the past and to think more about the future potentialities, 
Kim propagated a more positive view of Japan than many of his 
immediate predecessors (Lewis 2002, pp.120-126). His approach 
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was reciprocated by the Japanese, who proved willing to give him a 
form of written apology on his visit; a concession which was not 
accorded to the more abrasive Chinese President Jiang Zemin on his 
visit to Japan one month later. The second period, relating to the 
events of this year, will be discussed later.  
 
Economic power 
 
Deep economic links have been established between Japan and 
South Korea, but over the past four decades issues such as trade 
imbalances, tariffs and market access restrictions, aid and 
technology transfer have often become politicised. Undoubtedly, 
part of the reason for this lies in the highly complementary nature of 
the two economies; both export manufactured goods, import energy 
and raw materials, and have had highly protected agricultural 
sectors.  
 
Trade between South Korea and Japan increased significantly in the 
second half of the 1980s and this increasing trend has broadly 
continued during the 1990s, although the prolonged recession in 
Japan since the early 1990s and the 1997-98 financial crisis in South 
Korea have undoubtedly impacted on and slowed down this growth. 
Total bilateral trade has grown from US $ 33.3 billion in 1991 to 
$43.1 billion in 2001 and to $67.8 billion in 2004. Japan has been an 
important investor in South Korea, ranking behind the United States 
and the European Union as the third largest investor in South Korea, 
with an accumulated US$ 13.3 billion by the end of 2003, with the 
investment roughly equally in the manufacturing and the service 
sectors. South Korea has been much less active in investing in Japan 
(according to South Korean figures investing only $989 million by 
the end of 2003), mostly in the trading sector (China Daily, 25 
February 2005). By way of comparison, it should be noted that in 
only just over a decade, the cumulative total of South Korean 
investment in China has exceeded $14 billion. 
 
There has continued to be one important structural issue relating to 
bilateral trade, the trade imbalance which has been continuously in 
Japan’s favour. This, of course, has in large part reflected the 
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structural differences in the two economies. The trade balance was 
$8.5 billion in Japan’s favour in 1991 and had grown to $13 billion 
by 1997 before dropping drastically to $4.6 billion in 1998 when the 
financial crisis severely cut back South Korean imports from 
everywhere, including Japan. South Korean sensitivities to this 
imbalance have been reflected in the habit, at least until the 
mid-1980s, of citing the trade deficit in cumulative terms since 1965, 
restrictions on imports of certain Japanese products (for many years 
Seoul was the only Asian capital city with none of the ubiquitous 
Japanese cars), and frequent complaints to the Japanese about the 
need for better access to the Japanese market for Korean products.  
 
Nonetheless, in recent years some of the heat seems to have come 
out of the trade issues and the overall health of the economic 
relationship can be considered to be a positive development in 
Korea-Japan relations, or as Lee Jung-hoon and Moon Chung-in 
argue, ‘South Korea’s economic calculus has been radically shifting 
from a confrontational posture to a more cooperative one’ (Lee and 
Moon 2002, p.160). While Koreans remain unhappy about the once 
again rising trade deficits (by 2004 the gap had grown again to $ 24 
billion) the figures appear less politically sensitive. In accordance 
with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation, the South 
Korean restrictions on various Japanese products, which had been in 
force since the late 1970s under an import diversification 
programme, have been progressively dismantled and by mid-1999 
had been completely removed (Cheong 2004, p.223).  
 
Two elements, in particular, can be seen as contributing to this 
feeling of more positive economic interdependence. Firstly, is the 
extent to which South Korean and Japanese companies, previously 
fierce rivals, have come to cooperate and collaborate even in some 
areas of high technology. Up to the 1990s technology transfer was 
seen as a one-way street from Japan to South Korea, but with the 
Koreans often complaining about Japanese reticence to transfer the 
latest technologies. Recently, however, the prolonged recession in 
Japan has meant that Japanese companies, increasingly concerned 
about the costs of staying competitive, have become much more 
willing to collaborate on an equal basis with South Korean 
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companies in areas such as semi-conductor development. For 
example, in December 2004 Sony signed a cross-licensing 
agreement with Samsung Electronics to share patents across product 
lines. In addition, South Korean companies are even beating their 
Japanese counterparts to orders from Japanese companies, such as 
the order for 8 ships placed by Nippon Yusen with Hyundai Heavy 
Industries late last year (South China Morning Post, 8 November 
2004) 
 
Secondly, belatedly following on what has become a growing trend 
around the Asian Pacific region, especially for certain South-east 
Asian countries, Japan and South Korea are moving towards a free 
trade agreement (FTA). In contrast to the emphasis placed on 
globalization by the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Roh 
administration has demonstrated a strong interest in regional 
linkages. Although the Roh government managed to conclude its 
first ever FTA with Chile (which finally came into force, after 
overcoming considerable domestic resistance from Korean farmers, 
in April 2004), it was more interested to develop such arrangements 
with its Asian neighbours, including Japan. Japan, too, had been 
rather slow off the mark in negotiating FTAs and its first one, with 
Singapore, was only concluded in January 2002.  
 
Studies on the costs and benefits of a Korea-Japan FTA, carried out 
bilaterally by think-tanks, business organisations and eventually 
government officials, started in the late 1990s and were generally 
favourable towards such an agreement, but not until December 2003 
did formal governmental-level negotiations begin. The Korean 
government does expect that in the short-run there would be a 
further increase in the trade deficit with Japan on the entry into force 
of a FTA, but that in the longer-term the cooperative benefits would 
be greater (Cheong 2004, pp. 228-234). Although business 
organisations are supportive in general, clearly certain sectors in 
each country are concerned about the specific impact on them. On 
the Korean side, the car industry and the smaller and medium-sized 
electronics components-makers are worried about a flood of 
Japanese products coming in, while on the Japanese side the worry is 
more about the competitive agricultural and fishery products coming 
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in from Korea (Nihon keizai shimbun, 1 March 2004). Nonetheless, 
both governments do seem committed to developing this FTA, with 
a target date of the end of 2005, but disagreements over agricultural 
trade issues had brought the negotiations almost to a standstill by 
early 2005 and recent tensions in other aspects of the relationship do 
not bode well for early progress. Nonetheless, conclusion of the FTA 
remains an objective for both sides’ officials and businessmen. 
 
Security imperatives 
 
At the height of the Cold War, the United States had hopes that its 
two allies, South Korea and Japan, could work together in an 
anti-communist bloc, but, although as Victor Cha has argued a form 
of ‘quasi-alliance’ emerged between these two countries, mutual 
antipathies and differing perspectives handicapped the degree of 
political and security cooperation (Cha 1999). South Korea was 
preoccupied, understandably, with the North Korean threat, whereas 
the Japanese worried more about the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold 
War world, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
concerns over suspected North Korean nuclear weapon development 
brought the Japanese closer to South Korean perspectives on the 
importance of managing North Korea.   
 
Yet, despite all the efforts to coordinate policies between South 
Korea, Japan and the United States over the North Korean issue, it 
has to be said that there have still been subtle differences in 
approaches and perspectives between the South Koreans and the 
Japanese through both of the nuclear crises of 1993-94 and 2002 to 
present.  In the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, South 
Korea’s Kim Young-sam administration was the more inconsistent 
in its policies, being particularly sensitive to being excluded from 
US-North Korea negotiations. Japan, on the other hand, expressed 
concern over the nuclear issue but stressed its inability to do 
anything to assist (and showed its marked reluctance to consider any 
action such as sanctions) (Ducke 2002, pp. 143-149). Nonetheless, 
both countries were relieved that a diplomatic deal (the October 
1994 Agreed Framework) rather than war had solved the crisis, both 
agreed to participate in the funding and management of the Korean 
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Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), and, with Japanese 
ministerial statements becoming blunter about the North Korean 
‘threat’, they appeared to be closer to similar strategic perceptions.   
 
This strategic closeness was to be reinforced, when, as a logical 
extension of his ‘sunshine policy’, the incoming Kim Dae-jung not 
only expressed no reservations about Japan developing closer links 
with North Korea but even positively welcomed such a tendency. 
President Roh Tae Woo, back in 1988, had announced a policy in 
which he expressed support for any improvement in the North’s 
relations with countries friendly to the South, but in practice the 
South Koreans had continued to watch with extreme caution any 
Japanese moves in the North’s direction. Kim Dae-jung adopted a 
much more relaxed approach. Not that there was much change 
immediately after Kim took up office, for Japan-North Korean 
normalisation negotiations had been on hold since 1992 as a result of 
disputes over a number of issues and, indeed, official Japanese views 
only hardened as a result of a North Korean missile test in 1998, in 
which a Taepodong missile flew over Japanese territory, and spy 
ship incursions in 1999. This meant that as Kim explored ways to 
‘warm up’ North Korea, culminating in the historic summit in 
Pyongyang in June 2000, and the Clinton administration also toyed 
with better relations with the North, Japan seemed to be lagging well 
behind (a brief flurry of contacts with the North in mid-2000 soon 
petered out).  
 
Let us consider the two-pronged approach of ‘pressure’ or 
containment and ‘dialogue’ or engagement towards North Korea 
which all the three ‘allies’ have employed to varying degrees since 
the early 1990s (Kim, Tadokoro and Bridges 2003). Both Kim 
Dae-jung and his successor Roh have put much greater emphasis on 
the engagement mode. In contrast to the engagement policy of 
Clinton in his second administration (it should be remembered that 
in 1994 he was actually very close to a military strike against North 
Korean facilities), Bush has put more emphasis on containment, 
albeit using pressure in a multilateral context. For Japan since 1992, 
when normalisation talks with the North collapsed, the balance has 
been tilted towards containment, though never far enough to 
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contemplate serious sanctions. Despite the high profile visits to 
Pyongyang in September 2002 and May 2004 by prime minister 
Koizumi, which brought partial but ultimately frustrating progress 
on the particular stumbling-block of the kidnapped Japanese citizens, 
the engagement mode has remained subordinate to the containment 
imperative (Hughes 2002; Izumi 2004). The Japanese government’s 
hands have been tied by the strength of public opinion in Japan, 
which is strongly anti-North Korean, whereas in South Korea there 
is much more of a split in public opinion over the desirability or 
otherwise of  conciliation towards the North, so allowing the Roh 
administration more flexibility. In addition, there is rather limited 
support for the Japanese case over the kidnapped Japanese amongst 
South Koreans with memories of those many Koreans that 
disappeared under Japanese rule. 
 
Yet, despite the apparent divergences between the current Japanese 
rhetorical hard line and the more conciliatory approach of the Roh 
administration towards the North, there may be some underlying 
similarity in their thinking, not least in their shared reluctance to use 
armed force to resolve the North Korean issue. Given the Japanese 
aversion to military action and even caution - though this caution has 
been losing efficacy recently - over economic sanctions on the 
Korean peninsula, it seems that both Japan and South Korea prefer a 
‘changed regime’ rather than a ‘regime change’ in the North 
(Konishi 2004). 
 
‘People power’ 
 
The above term does not imply the sense associated with the popular 
movement for democracy in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, but 
rather the concept of formal and informal institutional linkages 
discussed by Feldman (1999), in order to consider the ways in which 
the flows of people and popular culture and interactions between 
organisations have been impacting on the bilateral relationship.  
 
After the South Korean government loosened restrictions on 
overseas travel in 1987, the numbers of South Koreans visiting Japan 
increased steadily, from 809,000 in 1989 to 1.4 million in 2003 and 
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1.56 million last year. Similarly Japanese visitors to South Korea 
also increased steadily from the mid-1980s, passed the million mark 
for the first time in 1989 and rising to 1.8 million in 2003 and 2.43 
million last year (an increase of around 35% in one year alone). 
Regular shuttle flights go between Kinpo and Haneda airports and 
23 Japanese cities have direct air-links with South Korean 
counterparts. Events such as the co-hosted football World Cup in 
2002 undoubtedly contributed to the exchange of peoples. In the 
1980s and even into the 1990s a high proportion of the Japanese 
visitors were middle-aged men, presumably either businessmen or 
participants in ‘sex tours’, but the most recent trend, inspired by the 
attraction of visiting the sites of popular Korean dramas, has been 
for a marked increase in the numbers of Japanese women, especially 
middle-aged women.  
 
Both governments have been slowly loosening visa restrictions to 
help these flows of people.  South Koreans are being given 
visa-free access from March-September this year to encourage 
visitors to the Aichi World Expo, with the possibility that this 
concession may be extended (Japan Times, 5 June 2004; Chosun 
Ilbo, 28 March 2005). South Korea currently allows Japanese 
visa-free entry for up to 30 days and is considering extending this 
period. 
 
The popular interactions have been mostly demonstrably affected by 
the qualitative jump in popular culture flows in recent years. The 
Korean TV drama series ‘Winter Sonata’ has been aired four times 
on Japanese TV in the past 3 years and within the first year after it 
was aired the first time in Japan, NHK, the Japanese state 
broadcaster managed to sell 150,000 DVDs and videos, a million 
copies of the novel and 300,000 guidebooks for the drama. 
‘Yon-sama’ became the ‘word of the year’ in Japan in 2004 and the 
drama’s star was even honoured with a snow sculpture of himself at 
the Sapporo Snow Festival in February 2005. In the leading Japanese 
film magazine, Kinema Jumpo, four of the top ten foreign films in 
Japan last year were Korean (Chosun Ilbo internet edition, 7 January 
2005).  
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Important also are the increased number of formal and informal 
linkages between the two countries, through exchanges and contacts 
between students, academics, non-governmental organisations, 
media organisations, and sports and cultural bodies. These lead to a 
slow but steady thickening of the bilateral relationship. To give a 
few examples, firstly a survey in December 2004 showed Korean 
had overtaken German and French in terms of popularity as a foreign 
language taught in Japanese high schools (Chosun Ilbo internet 
edition, 9 January 2005), secondly, Seoul National University 
announced the setting up of its first ever Japan studies centre (Nihon 
keizai shimbun, 14 April 2004), and, thirdly, sumo wrestling 
tournaments in Seoul and Pusan in February 2004 proved immensely 
popular (Korea Times, 23 November 2004). However, the current 
bilateral political disputes may interrupt at least some of these 
exchanges for a short while.  
 
Two steps forward and one step back? 
 
The analysis above suggests a slowly improving bilateral 
relationship, albeit one which is still subject to strong emotional 
surges and responses to perceived slights on both sides. But does 
that mean that real reconciliation is occurring?  
 
Recent literature on the concept of reconciliation suggests that a 
mixture of moral imperative and pragmatic interest is crucial to 
developing new and constructive relationships between former 
enemies. According to the framework developed by Feldman, the 
exact mix and consequent progress (or lack of progress) in 
reconciliation seems to revolve around four variables: the 
confrontation with the past, the degree of institutionalized 
transformation, the skill of political leaders, and the configuration of 
the international environment (Feldman 1999, pp. 334-37).  
 
Looking at these four variables, it has to be said that the 
history-related issues, on which South Korea clearly has moral 
leverage, remain potent in the relationship. History has been painful 
and demanding in the case of Korea-Japan relations and, as the 
recent flare-up suggests, the process of reconciliation in this aspect is 
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by no means complete. Japan’s efforts to come to terms with its past, 
at first begrudging but recently more forthcoming, have remained 
problematic in both countries - seen as not sufficient in South Korea 
and seen in Japan as bowing too much to South Korean demands.  
 
Secondly, the slow but steady process of institutionalisation of 
governmental, business and societal networks and contacts has 
proceeded positively, despite occasional hiccups. Ministers from 
both countries meet increasingly regularly, as do officials from 
different ministries and agencies. Even exchanges and consultations 
amongst defence-related officials, long taboo, have become more 
evident since the late 1990s (Lee and Moon 2002, p.150).  Links 
between politicians have long been in place, although generational 
change, particularly on the South Korean side, make these personal 
linkages occasionally intermittent. From the early 1990s Japanese 
prime ministers and South Korean presidents began to meet more 
frequently and with less fan-fare, and since 2002 there have been 
regular six-monthly informal working (or ‘no necktie’) summits in 
alternate countries. The two major business organisations, Japan’s 
Keidanren and South Korea’s Federation of Korean Industries, have 
frequent meetings and, for example, since 2001 they have lobbied 
together for the conclusion of a bilateral FTA. The growing 
economic interdependence, no longer such a one-sided economic 
power equation, provides positive influences. Non-governmental 
organisations in both countries too have extended their contacts in 
recent years, aided no doubt by the strong interest in using the 
internet in both populations. The heightened interest in the popular 
culture and tourist sites of the other country also acts in a beneficial 
manner (in one recent survey of Japanese who admitted that their 
views of South Korea had improved in recent years, 80% pointed to 
Korean films and dramas as a reason. Nihon keizai shimbun, 20 
December 2004)  
 
Thirdly, leaders do make a difference. The positive role of Kim 
Dae-jung was discussed earlier, but what about the second period, 
namely this year? Is President Roh now willing to risk reversing 
these positive developments?  Roh was careful in his remarks on 
1st March to reaffirm the position which he had adopted since 
 15
becoming president, namely that the past history would not be made 
a ‘diplomatic issue’ with Japan, but he seemed to be implying that he 
was expecting some kind of voluntary gesture from the Japanese 
(Korea Herald, 2 March 2005). His remarks might better be 
analysed in the light of the domestic political situation, where Roh 
has already been conducting a campaign to review Korea’s modern 
history during both the colonial period and the postwar authoritarian 
dictatorships (Korea Herald, 6 November 2004). Although this 
campaign actually led at an early stage to the resignation of the 
leader of the ruling Uri Party (South China Morning Post, 20 August 
2004), it seemed more likely that it was intended to discomfort the 
opposition Grand National Party, which is led by the daughter of 
former military strongman Park Chung-hee, during whose rule the 
Basic Treaty with Japan was concluded. A more short-term objective 
may have been to gain political mileage before a number of tricky 
by-elections, which the Uri party needed to win in order to restore its 
recently-lost wafer-thin majority in the National Assembly, in late 
April (although the Uri failed to win even one, so the anti-Japanese 
campaign’s impact was minimal in that sense). Nonetheless, it is too 
simplistic to say that domestic political considerations account solely 
for this new approach, since Roh’s comments certainly have had 
resonance with many Koreans.  
 
On the Japanese side, Koizumi’s approach also has had an impact on 
bilateral relations. Koizumi is nothing if not a nationalist and, while 
his primary focus has been on domestic economic restructuring, he 
has also wanted to push Japan into a more activist role in 
international relations. It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that despite his 
two path-breaking visits to Pyongyang in September 2002 and May 
2004, Japan has been forced back into a stalemate position on 
relations with North Korea because of the kidnapped Japanese issue 
and that, at the same time, part of his domestic agenda - a desire to 
regularly honour Japanese war dead at the Yasukuni shrine - has 
helped to constrain more dynamic relations with South Korea.  
 
The Japanese had been watching warily Roh’s historical review 
campaign since last year, not wishing to intervene but aware that it 
could easily overflow into anti-Japanism; Japanese officials also 
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tried to play down Roh’s 1st March remarks as being a ‘message’ to 
his domestic audience (Nihon keizai shimbun, 5 March 2005). The 
Japanese Foreign Ministry has found itself in a difficult position 
over the Shimane prefectural government’s decision to designate 
‘Takeshima Day’, being constitutionally limited in what it can do to 
dissuade local politicians from such actions and being forced to call 
for calm on both sides for the sake of the broader Japan-South 
Korean partnership in North-east Asia (Japan Times, 17 March 
2005, Nihon keizai shimbun, 17 March 2005). Although President 
Roh did talk of his willingness to risk a ‘diplomatic war’, he has also 
made it clear that he does not want to go as far as cutting off 
relations with Japan and, indeed, since Koizumi’s speech at the 
Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta on 22 April 2005 in which he 
expressed his ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ for Japan’s past 
actions, South Korean official statements have adopted a calmer 
tone. Now the ball is in Koizumi’s court; if he does not visit 
Yasukuni shrine in the near future, then relations can be set back on 
a more even keel.  
 
Finally, the changing international context. Since the end of the Cold 
War, a shared belief in peace and stability in North-east Asia has 
been drawing the two countries closer together. As discussed above, 
there are subtle differences of approach, particularly between the 
Roh and Koizumi administrations, in dealing with North Korea, but 
also apparent is a basic agreement that force is not the way to end 
the current impasse over the nuclear crisis. Both countries also 
appreciate the need to consult over the economic and military rise of 
China and the tendency of the Americans, particularly under the 
Bush administration, to act in ways which are occasionally 
unsettling to their Asian allies. While strains in the US-South Korean 
relationship have been more marked than in the US-Japanese 
relationship in recent years, the trilateral coordination with regard to 
KEDO and other aspects of the North Korean issue, plus the 
involvement of Japan and South Korea in the six-party talks, do 
provide further opportunities for interaction on political and security 
issues which cannot be handled so comfortably on a bilateral basis. 
Indeed, through participation in trilateral and multilateral formats, 
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Japan is probably now more actively involved in Korean security 
issues than at any time in the last six decades. 
 
As Caroline Rose, in her study of Sino-Japanese relations has 
argued, reconciliation ‘is a future-oriented, joint endeavour between 
the victims and perpetrators, but one that is lengthy, complex and 
prone to failure’ (Rose 2005, p. 21). There is likely to be no easy 
path to full reconciliation in Japan-Korean relations, but it is to be 
hoped that the two countries can steadily work through these 
bilateral problems and in turn provide a contribution to the larger 
problem of a structured and stable peace framework for North-east 
Asia. The four variables of reconciliation discussed above provide a 
mixed picture in the case of Japan-South Korean relations. Some 
such as the growing institutionalisation of bilateral linkages and the 
changing international environment can enhance reconciliation, 
whereas others such as the leaders’ personalities and policies and the 
regular resuscitation of historical problems slow down the process. 
President Roh intends to receive Koizumi in Seoul on 20 June at one 
of their regular half-yearly meetings. If both he and Koizumi are 
prepared to once again look forward, then hopefully this can be the 
first step towards returning to the road of reconciliation.  
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